Asher Sisneros

Asher K. Sisneros

September 20, 2024

Western Civilization Since 1493

Thomas E. Woods

Introduction

There is nothing new about martyrs willing to sacrifice their lives to displace so-called “tyrants” through assassination. In light of the Trump assassination attempts, the question of assassination seems to be at the forefront of everyone’s minds as they ponder its legitimacy. The dispute between Trump sympathizers and Trump haters is not whether it is just to assassinate tyrants, but whether Trump is and/or will be a totalitarian tyrant. However, this is the wrong debate, and any presupposition defending assassination as moral must be completely uprooted. Again, this is not a new philosophy or a new debate. It has existed for centuries, with the 16th-century philosopher Juan de Mariana standing at the forefront of those encouraging regicide. It was immoral under Philip II of Spain, and it is immoral under Donald Trump. 

Historical Context

First, it is important to understand the historical context of Mariana’s work De Rege (On Kingship). At the time, two competing political theories were on the rise: absolutism and constitutionalism. Mariana was a proponent of the latter theory, but he differed from his contemporaries in taking the theory to a new extreme, not only stating that civil magistrates are bound to govern by tradition and natural law, but even going so far as to say all citizens have a moral right and obligation to assassinate tyrants. As Murray N. Rothbard describes Mariana’s worldview: 

[The] most fascinating feature of the “extremism” of Mariana’s political theory was his creative innovation in the scholastic theory of tyrannicide. That a tyrant might be justly killed by the people had long been standard doctrine; but Mariana broadened it greatly in two significant ways. First, he expanded the definition of tyranny: a tyrant was any ruler who violated the laws of religion, who imposed taxes without the people’s consent, or who prevented a meeting of a democratic parliament. All the other scholastics, in contrast, had located the sole power to tax in the ruler. Even more spectacularly, to Mariana any individual citizen can justly assassinate a tyrant and may do so by any means necessary.¹

John Locke was another proponent of constitutionalism, arguing against the absolute power of monarchs, i.e., absolutism. Take, for example, King James I of England. This monarch of the era repeatedly spread rhetoric about the divine right of kings, which states that kings are given their authority by God, and as God’s instruments for wrath, they exercise absolute sovereignty on behalf of God. Although James was largely unsuccessful in consolidating power as an authoritarian monarch and ruled more moderately, his absolutist rhetoric still pervaded English society. For example, since the Protestant Geneva Bible had commentary against absolutism, he commissioned the Anglican Church to create a new Bible translation that did not: the King James Bible. Simultaneously, the Spanish monarchy exercised total control over the Spanish economy—granting monopoly privileges to certain companies, preventing a free market economy, and engaging in currency debasement—thus crippling their economy internally. From a religious avenue, the West was exiting a period of stringent control: in Spain, there was the Spanish Inquisition; in England, there was the reign of terror under “Bloody” Mary Tudor; in Germany, there was the Thirty Years’ War; and in France, thirty thousand Protestants were killed during the St. Bartholomew’s Day Massacre. All of that is just a small glimpse of the historical context Juan de Mariana came from when advocating for the widespread assassination of tyrants. Understandably, Mariana opposed all of this tyranny. 

The Question of Morality

However, even if one can sympathize with Mariana because of the historical context, that does not make his position moral. Sympathy does not inadvertently equal morality, and when analyzed from a moral perspective, Mariana’s positions hold no water. As the Apostle Paul says, “Let every soul be subject to the governing authorities. For there is no authority except from God, and the authorities that exist are appointed by God” (Romans 13:1). In an old, nearly forgotten sermon, Pastor Peter Allison argues this passage does not defend the divine right of kings but defends the divine right of the law. As Paul says later on in the passage, “For rulers are not a terror to good works, but to evil…for he does not bear the sword in vain; for he is God’s minister, an avenger to execute wrath on him who practices evil” (Romans 13:3-4). According to Allison, this passage is making two points, with a third derived conclusion: 

1. Civil rulers have power delegated from God; 
2. They have a moral duty to enforce God’s laws; and 
3. Thus, to the extent they do not enforce God’s laws or promote laws contrary to God’s laws, they are in rebellion and must repent or face God’s wrath. 

Thus, while Romans 13 certainly commands obedience to the civil magistrates, it also prescribes behavior for civil magistrates and plainly states their sole duty: to punish evil doers, as defined by the Bible. By definition, tyrannical rulers push the limits of their authority and create laws beyond God’s biblical prescription, hence the term “tyrant.” The question: is there a moral defense for their assassination; specifically, an assassination by a citizen? No. Take the feud between David and Saul, for example. Because of Saul’s sin, Samuel prophesied that David would take his place. In fact, by God’s command, Samuel even anointed David as king (1 Samuel 16:13). Nevertheless, David refused to kill Saul, even in self-defense, calling him “God’s anointed” (1 Samuel 24:6). On another occasion, when an Amalekite lied about killing Saul, expecting a reward from David, he was executed for capital crime (2 Samuel 1:1-10). Throughout the Old Testament, David always (rightly) revered Saul, not because he was a good man, but because of his God-given authority, i.e., the position he held. All biblically mandated authority—whether it be civil, ecclesiastical, or familial—deserves respect. As Pierre Viret put it in the 16th century: 

Therefore let us also understand that we must in no way tempt God, but must regard the magistrate as a minister of God…. For the wickedness and unbelief of a ruler can harm us no more than the unbelief of the father harms the child. If the child is believing, he must regard his father as a minister of God, and must honor and obey his commandments according to God, and the father’s unbelief can do no more harm than the unbelief of the husband to the faithful wife (1 Corinthians 7:13-14). If the father treats the child fiercely and harshly, he must bear and endure all patiently, leaving all vengeance to God…. If the father fulfills not his office, it is not lawful for the child to raise his hand against him…but he must still…honor him as his father….²

Notice that Viret says they deserve “honor” because of their office. He does not say unjust rulers who are in rebellion to Christ deserve unmitigated obedience. His contemporary John Calvin has a marvelous quote on this subject: 

For earthly princes lay aside their power when they rise up against God and are unworthy to be reckoned among the number of mankind. We ought, rather, to spit upon their heads than to obey them.³ 

Returning to the argument of assassination, it seems entirely illegitimate for a private citizen to kill a tyrant. Citizens cannot even morally execute vengeance on someone who has killed a family member. Why should they have a moral right to execute a tyrant? Just like murderers, tyrants must be punished by the appropriate authorities. Tyrants may—and should—be deposed because there are corporate negative sanctions for breaking God’s moral law, and the entire nation will face God’s corporate judgment because of their leader’s sin(s). For the preservation of the public good, tyrants must be displaced. But they should not be executed by private citizens. If national leaders are found guilty of a capital offense (e.g., treason, murder, pedophilia, etc.), as many of them are, then they deserve the death penalty as determined by a tribunal. But it is fully immoral for a private citizen to determine a person’s guilt on their own, without a trial, and enact quasi-justice through their own hands. Thus, assassination, even if it is done under the fine-sounding guise of “tyrannicide,” is immoral nonetheless. 

Proper Resistance to Tyranny

Even if assassination is immoral, there are still just means of resisting tyranny. The likelihood of a monarch or elected official being sent to court and found worthy of the death penalty is extremely low, especially since criminal cases are handled by the State. The case of King Charles I of England being executed by the Parliamentarians during the English Civil War was a very, very rare exception. In most cases, tyrants will not receive the death penalty, though getting deposed is a fairly simple process in a free democracy/republic with honest elections. But even in the case where a tyrant is not deposed or called before a tribunal, they can be resisted; not by a private citizen, but by a lesser magistrate. Thus enters the Christian doctrine of the lesser magistrates, which Matthew J. Trewhella concisely summarizes: 

As the title implies, a lesser magistrate is one who possesses less power than a higher magistrate…. The primary duty of the lesser magistrate regarding the doctrine of the lesser magistrates is threefold. First, they are to oppose and resist any laws or edict from the higher authority that contravenes the law or Word of God. Second, they are to protect the person, liberty, and property of those who reside within their jurisdiction from any unjust or immoral laws or actions by the higher authority. Third, they are not to implement any laws or decrees made by the higher authority that violate the Constitution, and if necessary, resist them.⁴ 

This is the surest and most just way to resist tyranny. It is not through unlawful rebellion. It is through the stepping up of honest and able men at the local level who can confidently resist tyranny. John Knox made the following plea to the lesser magistrates of his day: 

Shall you be excused, if with silence you pass over this iniquity? Be not deceived my lords. You are placed in authority for another purpose than to flatter your king in his folly and blind rage.⁵

Conclusion

To conclude, assassination is not legitimate, despite what Juan de Mariana may say. Even if the person is a “despotic totalitarian,” a pejorative excessively misused in America to the point where it is a humorous badge of honor, the so-called totalitarian cannot be assassinated by a private citizen who does not possess the moral authority to execute criminals. Assassination may be legitimate where there is a declaration of war, but outside of that context, it is inappropriate. Thus, assassins are not heroic defenders of liberty; they are traitors. Tyranny must be resisted for the preservation of a free society, but assassination is not the way. The rule of law must stand.

1. Murray N. Rothbard, The Learned Extremist: Juan de Mariana, (Auburn, Alabama: Mises Institute, 2010) ↩︎
2. Pierre Viret, ed. R. A. Sheats, Pierre Viret: The Angel of the Reformation, (Tallahassee, Florida: Zurich Publishing, 2012), 68 ↩︎
3. John Calvin, ed. Matthew J. Trewhella, The Doctrine of the Lesser Magistrates, (South Charleston, South Carolina: Matthew J. Trewhella, 2013), 13 ↩︎
4. Trewhella, Lesser Magistrates, 15 ↩︎
5. John Knox, ed. Trewhella, Lesser Magistrates, 43 ↩︎